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Despite knowing little about nanotechnology (so to speak), members of 
the public readily form opinions on whether its potential risks outweigh 
its potential benefits.  On what basis are they forming their judgments? 
How are their views likely to evolve as they become exposed to more in-
formation about this novel science? We conducted a survey experiment 
(N = 1,850) to answer these questions. We found that public perceptions 
of nanotechnology risks, like public perceptions of societal risks generally, 
are largely affect driven: individuals’ visceral reactions to nanotechnology 
(ones likely based on attitudes toward environmental risks generally) ex-
plain more of the variance in individuals’ perceptions of nanotechnology’s 
risks and benefits than does any other influence. These views are not 
static: even a small amount of information can generate changes in per-
ceptions. But how those perceptions change depends heavily on individu-
als’ values. Using a between-subjects design, we found that individuals 
exposed to balanced information polarize along cultural and political lines 
relative to individuals not exposed to information.  We discuss what these 
findings imply for understanding of risk perceptions generally and for the 
future of nanotechnology as a subject of political conflict and regulation. 
1. Introduction: As Goes Berkeley, . . .? 
In December 2006, Berkeley, California, became the first governmental 
entity in the United States to regulate nanotechnology. Facilities that manufac-
ture or use nanoparticles must now file reports with city officials disclosing 
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“how [they]  will safely handle, monitor, contain, dispose, track inventory, [and] 
prevent releases” of these materials.1 
Far more remarkable, however, than the content of this (very modest) 
regulation are how little time and information municipal officials needed to de-
cide it was necessary. Having never heard of nanotechnology before the Univer-
sity of California proposed construction of a research laboratory, the city’s haz-
ardous waste director immediately commenced an inquiry to determine 
whether it posed a threat to public safety.  “We sent them a bunch of questions 
starting with: ‘What the heck is a nanoparticle?’ ”2 Regulators were quickly able 
to learn that, but not much more: “The human health impacts of nanoparti-
cles,” the city’s Environmental Advisory Commission reported, “are very com-
plex and are only beginning to be understood.” Nevertheless, citing concerns 
that nanoparticles might “penetrate skin and lung tissue” and possibly “block 
or interfere with essential reactions” inside human cells, officials concluded 
that a precautionary stance was in order.3 
What should those who are interested in public attitudes toward 
nanotechnology make of Berkeley’s response? Why did regulators react with 
nearly instantaneous concern toward this novel form of science?  Why did their 
anxieties seem to grow in the face of admittedly indefinite information? How are 
they, and publicly accountable officials elsewhere, likely to react as they learn 
even more about this nascent technology? 
We conducted a study to help answer these questions.  It involved a 
sample of approximately 1,800 Americans, whose knowledge of and attitudes 
toward nanotechnology were assessed, both in the presence and in the absence 
of information about nanotechnology’s potential risks and benefits. 
                                       
1 Berkeley Municipal Code § 15.12.040. 
2 Barnaby J. Feder, Teeny-Weeny Rules for Itty-Bitty Atom Clusters, N.Y. Times, § 4, Jan. 14, 
2007 (quoting Nabil Al-Hadithy). 
3 Memorandum from Community Environmental Advisory Commission to Mayor and City 
Council, at 2 (Dec. 5, 2006). 
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The results were instructive.  Before being furnished with information, 
the vast majority of our subjects knew little if anything about nanotechnology, 
yet the vast majority of them formed an immediate opinion, one way or the 
other, about whether its benefits outweighed its risks.  The driving force behind 
these snap judgments, we found, was affect: the visceral, emotional responses 
of our subjects, pro or con, determined how beneficial or dangerous they 
thought nanotechnology was likely to be—a result in keeping with the force 
that affect is known to exert over perceptions of personal and societal risks 
generally.4 
These instantaneous judgments were not static, however.  Individuals 
exposed to information on the risks and benefits of nanotechnology formed 
views different from individuals not so informed.  But the ways in which infor-
mation influenced our subjects—whether it inclined them to see nanotechnol-
ogy as more risky or more beneficial—was highly conditional on the values they 
held. This finding, too, is consistent with previous work documenting the role 
that different worldviews—hierarchical and egalitarian, individualistic and 
communitarian—play in orienting persons’ assessments of the dangers differ-
ent forms of commerce and technology pose to public safety.5 
These results paint a picture, then, of at least one possible future for 
nanotechnology.  It is one in which citizens rapidly take affect-driven positions, 
which harden as they conform what they learn thereafter to their more basic 
cultural attitudes toward technology and risk.  The result is likely to be a state 
of political polarization over the desirability of nanotechnology that very much 
resembles the one that now exists other controversial environmental issues, in-
cluding nuclear power and global warming.  Or at least that is how things are 
likely to play out absent the development of strategies that neutralize the ten-
                                       
4 See Paul Slovic, The Perception of Risk 403-06 (2000). 
5 See generally Dan M. Kahan, Paul Slovic, Donald Braman & John Gastil, Fear of Democracy: 
A Cultural Critique of Sunstein on Risk, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1071, 1083-88 (2006). Much of this 
work is based on the ongoing research of the Cultural Cognition Project. Background on the 
Project and access to related data and papers can be found at 
http://research.yale.edu/culturalcognition/. 
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dency of persons to assimilate information in a manner that confirms their 
emotional and cultural predispositions. 
The rest of this paper elaborates on these claims.  We start, in part 2, 
with an account of the background of our investigation of nanotechnology risk 
perceptions.  In part 3, we describe the hypotheses and design of our study, 
and in part 4 the results.  We then turn in part 5 to a discussion of the impli-
cations of our findings for the likely career of nanotechnology risk perceptions 
in the United States.  And finally, in part 6, we conclude. 
2. Background: What We Know, What We Don’t, and Some Conjec-
tures 
Not much more is known about public perceptions of the risks of 
nanotechnology than is known about nanotechnology risks themselves.  A lot is 
known, however, about the nature of public risk perceptions generally.  When 
the insights of the science of risk perception are combined with the work that 
has been done on attitudes toward nanotechnology, it is possible to form some 
fairly plausible conjectures about why people react the way they do to this nas-
cent technology and how their positions are likely to evolve as more information 
becomes publicly available. 
The most basic insight generated by risk-perception research is that atti-
tudes toward putatively dangerous activities—from nuclear power generation to 
firearms possession to smoking—are affect driven.  The visceral reactions im-
ages and emotions such activities arouse are the strongest predictor of whether 
individuals view them as socially deleterious or benign.6  Affect has been found 
to operate as a heuristic substitute for more systematic forms of reasoning 
when individuals have access to relatively little information or little time to as-
sess it.7 Affect also interacts with various other processes of cognition: emo-
                                       
6 See, e.g., P. Slovic, E. Peters, M. L. Finucane & D. G. MacGregor, Affect, Risk, and Decision 
Making, 24 Health Psychol. S35 (2005); George F. Loewenstein, Elke U. Weber, Christopher K. 
Hsee & Ned Welch, Risk as Feelings, 127 Psych. Bull. 267 (2001). 
7 See, e.g., Paul Slovic, Melissa L. Finucane, Ellen Peters & Donald G. MacGregor, Risk as 
Analysis and Risk as Feelings: Some Thoughts About Affect, Reason, Risk, and Rationality, 24 
Risk Anal. 311-322 (2004). 
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tionally charged events, for example, are more likely to be noticed and recalled, 
thereby biasing estimations of their likelihood;8 feelings such as fear and hope 
skew individual estimations toward the probability of adverse and favorable 
outcomes;9 the desire to avoid dissonance disposes individuals to conform their 
processing of information about risks and benefits toward their feelings about a 
putatively dangerous activity.10 It has also plausibly been argued that evolu-
tionary processes have endowed human beings with a disposition to rely on 
certain emotions, such as disgust, to help them discern sources of potential 
harm.11 
It stands to reason, then, that affect will influence perceptions of nanote-
chnology risks. The immediacy of the apprehension experienced by Berkeley 
regulators and their decision to regulate on the basis of exceedingly little in-
formation about its dangers, for example, comport with an affective style of rea-
soning. 
The findings of previous studies of nanotechnology attitudes also hint at 
the role affect plays.  A national survey conducted by Peter Hart Research As-
sociates found that although a large majority of respondents reported having 
heard “little” or “nothing at all” about nanotechnology before being polled, a 
majority still had a position on whether its risks would outweigh its benefits.12  
Again, affect would explain why so many persons without significant knowledge 
about nanotechnology would nevertheless have an opinion about how danger-
ous it is. An informative study by Steven Currall and fellow researchers found 
that public perceptions of the risks and benefits of nanotechnology are in-
versely correlated—that is, that people who believe nanotechnology is beneficial 
                                       
8 See Cass R. Sunstein, Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 64 (2005). 
9 See Yuval Rottenstreich & Christopher K. Hsee, Money, Kisses, and Electric Shocks: On the 
Affective Psychology of Risk, 12 Psych. Sci. 185 (2001). 
10 See Slovic, supra note 4, at 404-05. 
11 See Valerie Curtis & Adam Biran, Dirt, Disgust, and Disease: Is Hygiene in Our Genes? 44 
Perspectives in Biology & Med. 17 (2001). 
12 See Peter D. Hart Research Associates, Inc., Report Findings, at 6-7 (Sept. 19, 2006), avail-
able at http://www.nanotechproject.org/file_download/98. 
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also tend to believe it is risky, and vice versa.13  Currall and his associates 
characterized this result as suggesting that for ordinary people nanotechnology 
“risks and benefits are both enmeshed in a complex decision-making calcu-
lus.”14 But an alternative interpretation is that individuals’ perceptions are 
simple and affective: to avoid dissonance, individuals conform their assess-
ments of both the risks and benefits of nanotechnology to their feelings about 
it.  Indeed, numerous studies have shown that exactly this dynamic generates 
inversely correlated judgments of risk and benefit for all manner of affect-
driven risk perceptions.15 
Another important insight in the study of risk perceptions generally is 
the impact of cultural outlooks.  Shared systems of value invest putatively 
dangerous activities with social meanings (human mastery or hubris; self-
reliance or selfishness; virility or contemptible self-indulgence), which in turn 
determine whether those activities generate positive affective responses (hope, 
pride, admiration) or negative ones (dread, fear, disgust).16  Shared group com-
mitments also affect the processing of information about risk. Individuals are 
more likely to seek out and to credit information about societal dangers from 
those who share their basic understanding of the good life.  They are also loath 
to form factual beliefs that differ from those same persons, lest they be de-
prived of important forms of social and emotional support.17  As a result, per-
ceptions of what sorts of activities are dangerous, and what sorts of policies are 
likely to abate those risks, tend to be uniform among persons who subscribe to 
a shared cultural ethic and polarized across persons who subscribe to compet-
                                       
13 See Steven C. Currall, Eden B. King, Neal Lane, Juan Madera & Stacey Turner, What Drives 
Public Acceptance of Nanotechnology? Nature Nanotechnology, Dec. 2006, at 154-55. 
14 Id. at 155. 
15 See generally Melissa L. Finucane, Ali Alhakami, Paul Slovic & Stephen M. Johnson, The 
Affect Heuristic in Judgments of Risks and Benefits, 13 J. Behav. Decisionmaking 1 (2000). 
16 See, e.g., Ellen M. Peters, An Emotion-Based Model of Risk Perception and Stigma Susceptibil-
ity: Cognitive Appraisals of Emotion, Affective Reactivity, Worldviews, and Risk Perceptions in the 
Generation of Technological Stigma, 24 Risk Analysis 1347 (2004). 
17 See, e.g., Geoffrey L. Cohen, Party over Policy: The Dominating Impact of Group Influence on 
Political Beliefs, 85 J. Personality & Social Psych. 808 (2003); Serena Chen, Kimberly 
Duckworth & Shelly Chaiken, Motivated Heuristic and Systematic Processing, 10 Psych. Inq. 44 
(1999). 
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ing ones.18 The sum total of these and like social influences on risk perception 
generate a phenomenon that can be called the “cultural cognition of risk.”19 
Drawing heavily on the work of anthropologist Mary Douglas,20 one con-
ception of the cultural cognition of risk divides cultural outlooks along two 
cross-cutting dimensions.21 The first, “hierarchy-egalitarianism,” characterizes 
the relative preference of persons for a society in which resources, opportuni-
ties, privileges and duties are distributed along fixed and differentiated lines (of 
gender, race, religion, and class, for example) versus one in which those goods 
are distributed without regard to such differences.  The other, “individualism-
communitarianism,” characterizes the relative preferences of persons for a so-
ciety in which individuals secure the conditions for their own flourishing with-
out collective interference versus one in which the collective is charged with se-
curing its members’ basic needs and in which individual interests are subordi-
nated to collective ones. 
Individual risk perceptions, this position asserts, reflect and reinforce 
their cultural outlooks so defined.  Accordingly, egalitarians and communi-
tarians are relatively sensitive to environmental and technological risks, 
abatement of which justifies regulating activities that generate inequalities and 
symbolize unconstrained pursuit of individual self-interest.  Because they prize 
the autonomy of markets and other private orderings, individualists tend to be 
dismissive of claims that commerce and industry are dangerous and worthy of 
regulation.  So do hierarchists, who see assertions of environmental risk as im-
                                       
18 See Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble: Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 Yale L.J. 71, 
92-94 (2001); Donald Braman, Dan M. Kahan & James Grimmelmann, Modeling Facts, Culture, 
and Cognition in the Gun Debate, 18 Soc. J. Res. 283 (2005). 
19 See generally  Paul DiMaggio, Culture and Cognition, 23 Ann. Rev. Sociology 263 (1997) (de-
veloping theory that mechanisms of cognition mediate role between cultural commitments and 
various types of perceptions); Dan M. Kahan, Paul Slovic, Donald Braman & John Gastil, Fear 
of Democracy: A Cultural Critique of Sunstein on Risk, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1071, 1083-88 (2006) 
(applying this approach to risk perception). 
20 Mary Douglas, Natural Symbols, viii (1970). 
21 See generally Dan M. Kahan, Donald Braman, John Gastil, Paul Slovic, & C.K. Mertz, Gen-
der, Race and Risk Perceptions: The Influence of Cultural Status Anxiety, 4 J. Empirical Legal 
Stud. 465 (2007). 
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plicitly challenging the authority of societal and governmental elites.22  Hierar-
chists and individualists have their own risk anxieties—of market disruption 
and unduly invasive restrictions of hand guns—which egalitarians and com-
munitarians likewise dismiss.  There are also issues, such as the dangers of 
social deviancy, on which hierarchs and communitarians square off against 
egalitarians and individualists.  Work by us and by other researchers have 
strongly documented these patterns of risk perception.23 
There is reason to think that cultural worldviews do—or over time will—
influence nanotechnology risks, too.  In the Hart poll, for example, whites and 
men were significantly less disposed to see nanotechnology as risky than Afri-
can-Americans and women.24  These demographic characteristics tend to cor-
relate with, and thus can be seen as rough proxies for, the worldviews charac-
terized by hierarchy-egalitarianism and individualism-communitarianism.25  In 
addition, after respondents were furnished information about the risks and 
benefits of nanotechnology, significant differences also emerged between Re-
publicans and Democrats, affiliations that also correlate (although imperfect-
ly26) with these outlooks.27  That the effect of information varies along demo-
                                       
22 See generally Mary Douglas & Aaron B. Wildavsky, Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selec-
tion of Technical and Environmental Dangers (1982).   
23 See e.g., Karl Dake, Orienting Dispositions in the Perception of Risk: An Analysis of Contempo-
rary Worldviews and Cultural Biases, 22 J. Cross-Cultural Psych. 61 (1991); Ellen Peters & 
Paul Slovic, The Role of Affect and Worldviews as Orienting Dispositions in the Perception and 
Acceptance of Nuclear Power, 26 Journal of Applied Social Psychology 1427-1453 (1996); Hank 
C. Jenkins-Smith, Modeling Stigma: An Empirical Analysis of Nuclear Waste Images of Nevada, 
in Risk, Media, and Stigma: Understanding Public Challenges to Modern Science and Technol-
ogy 107 (P. S. James Flynn, and Howard Kunreuther ed., 2001); Poortinga, Steg & Vlek, Envi-
ronmental Risk Concern and Preferences for Energy-Saving Measures, 34 Environment & Be-
havior 455 (2002). See generally Kahan, supra note 5, at 1085-87 (describing our findings and 
citing additional studies). 
24 The Hart poll report notes the difference between men and women. See Hart & Assoc., supra 
note 12, at 7.  Our independent evaluation of the data, which we obtained from the Project on 
Emerging Nanotechnologies, showed the race effect. 
25 See generally Kahan et al., supra note 21. 
26 See generally John Gastil, Dan M. Kahan, Donald Braman & Paul Slovic, The “Wildavsky 
Heuristic”: The Cultural Orientation of Mass Political Opinion (unpublished manuscript, Oct. 15, 
2005), available at http://research.yale.edu/culturalcognition/content/view/92/90/. 
27 We observed this effect in our own multivariate regression analysis of the Hart data. 
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graphic and ideological lines can thus be seen as evidence of a cultural bias in 
the processing of information. 
Putting all this together, one can at least imagine a richer, and more de-
tailed, picture of the formation and evolution of nanotechnology risk percep-
tions.  On this view, individuals, particularly poorly informed ones, are likely to 
form reactions that are largely affective in nature.  More informed persons 
might be less likely to rely on affect.  But their views are even more likely to 
have a recognizable cultural complexion.  Indeed, one might surmise that the 
effect of learning more about the risks and benefits of nanotechnology will not 
be to generate consensus but rather to provoke dissensus along ideological or 
cultural lines. 
These are, of course, conjectures.  So we devised a more rigorous empiri-
cal study to test them. 
3.  An Experimental Study of Nanotechnology Risk Perceptions 
3.1. Hypotheses 
Our study focused on two major hypotheses and a number of related 
subhypotheses.  The first major hypothesis was that individuals’ perceptions of 
nanotechnology risks and benefits would be affect driven. 
A subhypothesis was that affect toward nanotechnology would itself be 
explained by individuals’ dispositions toward environmental risks generally.  
Confronted with a novel form of technology, individuals, we surmised, would 
likely form their affective appraisals based on whether they generally see tech-
nology as societally dangerous or beneficial.28   
In the same vein, we also predicted that affect toward nanotechnology 
would reflect subjects’ cultural dispositions.  Because cultural outlooks tend to 
                                       
28 See generally Anthony Leiserowitz, Communicating the Risks of Global Warming: American 
Risk Perceptions, Affective Images and Interpretive Communities,” in Communication and Social 
Change: Strategies for Dealing with the Climate Crisis (forthcoming 2007) (finding that members 
of the public can be classified according to shared categories of risk perception that themselves 
reflect broader values). 
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influence whether an individual’s affect is negative or positive, we conjectured 
that outlooks could be expected to have at least some impact on nanotechnol-
ogy affect.  We predicted, in particular, that hierarchical and individualist sub-
jects would have a relatively positive affective response to nanotechnology, and 
egalitarian and communitarian subjects a relatively negative one, in accord 
with the dispositions of such persons toward environmental risks generally. 
Our second major hypothesis was that individuals would react to infor-
mation about nanotechnology risks and benefits in a manner that reflected 
their cultural outlooks.  The phenomenon of “biased assimilation and polariza-
tion” refers to the tendency of people who disagree on a disputed issue to con-
strue information in a way that supports their existing views and thus to form 
views that are even more divergent.29  We predicted that subjects’ cultural pre-
dispositions toward environmental risks would bias their assimilation of infor-
mation about nanotechnology risks and thus polarize subjects along cultural 
lines.  Specifically, we predicted that the more hierarchical and individualistic 
subjects were, the more favorable their views would become as they were ex-
posed to information, whereas the more egalitarian and communitarian sub-
jects were, the more negative their views would become.  A subhypothesis was 
that individuals would become polarized along other lines characteristic of dis-
agreements about environmental risks, including gender, race, and ideology.   
3.2. Study Design 
3.2.1. Sample 
The sample consisted of approximately 1,850 individuals demographi-
cally weighted to reflect national representativeness.30  They were drawn from a 
                                       
29 See Charles G. Lord, Lee Ross & Mark R. Leper, Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polariza-
tion: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 11 J. Personality & Soc. 
Psych. 2098-2109 (1979). 
30 Numerous studies have shown that the on-line samples and testing methods of Knowledge 
Networks yield results equivalent in reliability to conventional random-digit-dial surveys. Stud-
ies based on those samples and methods are routinely published in academic journals. See 
http://www.knowledgenetworks.com/ganp/2005aapor.html; 
http://www.knowledgenetworks.com/ganp/docs/List%20of%20Journals%208-28-2006.pdf A 
more complete description of the composition of Knowledge Networks and of the demographic 
characteristics of the sample used in this study appears in Appendix A. 
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panel of on-line survey respondents assembled by Knowledge Networks for par-
ticipation in scholarly public opinion analysis. The subjects were administered 
an on-line survey-experiment that consisted of approximately 50 questions and 
that took an average of approximately 10 minutes to complete.31  Survey re-
sponses were collected between December 14, 2006, and December 28, 2006. 
3.2.2. Measures 
3.2.2.1. Cultural Worldviews 
The subjects’ cultural worldviews were measured with two scales devel-
oped for use in a previous national study of cultural orientations and risk per-
ceptions.32  “Hierarchy-Egalitarianism” (“Hierarchy”) consisted of 12 items, and 
“Individualism-Communitarianism” (“Individualism”) 18 items, designed to as-
sess subjects’ worldviews along those two dimensions.  Both were highly reli-
able (Hierarchy, α = .81; Individualism α = .83). 
We also divided our subjects into “types” reflecting their cultural world-
views.  Based on their scores relative to the median ones for Hierarchy and In-
dividualism, individuals were designated as either “Hierarchs” or “Egalitarians,” 
and as either “Individualists” or “Communitarians.”  They were further divided 
into four distinct types— “Hierarchical Individualists,” “Hierarchical Communi-
tarians,” “Egalitarian Individualists, and “Egalitarian Communitarians”—based 
on the combinations of these designations. 
3.2.2.2. Other Individual Characteristics 
Various demographic characteristics of interest were collected.  These in-
cluded the subjects’ races, their genders, their ages, their education levels, 
their household incomes, their parental status, their political party affiliations 
and their political ideologies (measured with a liberal-conservative scale). Sub-
jects were also asked to indicate whether they “strongly disagreed,” “disagreed,” 
“agreed,” [or] “strongly agreed” with the statement, “The federal government can 
                                       
31 Pertinent elements of the survey instrument appear in Appendix B.  
32 See generally Kahan et al., supra note 21. 
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be trusted to protect the public from environmental and technological risks” 
(Govtrust). 
3.2.2.3. Nanotechnology 
The experiment-survey instrument contained a number of items relating 
to nanotechnology.  One (“Nanoknow”) asked “[h]ow much have you heard 
about nanotechnology before today?,” and permitted responses of “nothing at 
all,” “just a little,” “some,” and “a lot.”33  Subjects who indicated they had heard 
“nothing at all” or “just a little” were classified as having “low knowledge,” those 
who had heard “some” as “moderate knowledge,” and those who had heard “a 
lot” as “high knowledge” with respect to nanotechnology. 
Another item (“Nanoaffc”) measured respondents’ affect toward nanotech-
nology.  Using a “bipolar” scale previously found to be a reliable and robust 
measure of affective attitudes,34 this item asked “[h]ow would you say 
nanotechnology makes you feel?,” and permitted responses of “very bad,” 
“bad,” “neither good nor bad,” “good,” and “very good.”   
Finally, respondents’ perceptions of nanotechnology risks was measured 
with an item (“Nanorisk”) that asked them “[d]o you think the risks of 
nanotechnology will greatly outweigh its benefits, the risks of nanotechnology 
will slightly outweigh its benefits, the benefits of nanotechnology will slightly 
outweigh its risks[,] [or] the benefits of nanotechnology will greatly outweigh its 
risks[?]”   
                                       
33 Subjects were instructed that they should refuse to answer this or any other question on 
which they were “unsure.” This instruction has been found to generate the same rate of “don’t 
know/unsure” responses among on-line survey respondents as permitting only a volunteered 
“don’t know/unsure” response in telephone surveys. See J. Michael Dennis, Rick Li, & Cindy 
Chatt, Benchmarking Knowledge Networks’ Web-Enabled Panel Survey of Selected GSS Ques-
tions Against GSS In-Person Interviews (Unpublished manuscript, Feb. 2004), available at 
http://www.knowledgenetworks.com/ganp/docs/GSS%202002%20DK%20Rates%20on%20K
N%20Panel%20v3.pdf. 
34 Ellen Peters & Paul Slovic, Affective Asynchrony and the Measurement of the Affective Atti-
tude Component, Cognition & Emotion (forthcoming 2007). 
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Nanoknow and Nanorisk were adapted from the Hart survey. In contrast 
to that survey, however, the nanotechnology items in our experiment-survey 
instrument were introduced (as a group) with this statement: 
Now we would like to know what you think about nanotechnology. 
Nanotechnology is the ability to measure, see, predict and make things 
on the extremely small scale of atoms and molecules.  Materials created 
with nanotechnology can often be made to exhibit very different physical, 
chemical, and biological properties than their normal size counterparts. 
This brief and nonjudgmental language was included with the expectation that 
without at least a minimal description of nanotechnology those who responded 
“nothing at all” to the prior knowledge item (“Nanoknow”) would feel it was in-
appropriate to offer a response to Nanorisk even if they had an opinion on 
nanotechnology’s relative risks and benefits.  
3.2.2.4. Other Risk Perceptions 
Subjects were asked to specify whether they regarded a set of additional 
activities as presenting “almost no risk,” “slight risk,” “moderate risk” or “high 
risk.”  These included “global warming” and “nuclear power,” which were com-
bined into a single measure of environmental risk (“Envrisk,” α = .57). 
3.2.3. Information Experiment 
The subjects were divided into two groups.  The “no information treat-
ment” group was exposed to no information about nanotechnology aside from 
the minimal introductory statement.  The “information treatment” group re-
ceived two paragraphs of additional information (the order of which was ran-
domly varied) relating, respectively, to the benefits and risks of nanotechnology: 
The potential benefits of nanotechnology include the use of nanomateri-
als in products to make them stronger, lighter and more effective.  Some 
examples are food containers that kill bacteria, stain-resistant clothing, 
high performance sporting goods, faster, smaller computers, and more 
effective skincare products and sunscreens.  Nanotechnology also has 
the potential to provide new and better ways to treat disease, clean up 
the environment, enhance national security, and provide cheaper energy.   
While there has not been conclusive research on the potential risks of 
nanotechnology, there are concerns that some of the same properties 
that make nanomaterials useful might make them harmful.  It is thought 
that some nanomaterials may be harmful to humans if they are breathed 
in and might cause harm to the environment.  There are also concerns 
that invisible, nanotechnology-based monitoring devices could pose a 
threat to national security and personal privacy. 
-13- 
  
These statements preceded the nanotechnology risk and affect items for the in-
formation-treatment group subjects. 
The rationale for dividing the subjects into two groups was to facilitate a 
valid evaluation of the effect of information.  The Hart survey had assessed the 
evaluation of the impact of information with a within-subjects design—that is, 
by re-measuring nanotechnology risk perceptions of the same subjects before 
and after they received information. In such a design, changes in responses 
could be thought to reflect a contrived disposition on the part of subjects to 
appear open-minded and receptive to information.  To avoid a confounding in-
terpretation of this sort, we decided to use a between-subjects design—one in 
which the responses of subjects who received no information would be com-
pared to those of informed subjects who offered their responses only after re-
ceiving information. 
The sizes of the two groups differed: approximately 1,500 for the no-
information treatment group and approximately 350 for the information-
treatment group.  The larger sample size for the no-information group was se-
lected in order to assure adequate power to facilitate the detection of relatively 
small effect sizes in the anticipated multivariate regression analysis of 
nanotechnology risk perceptions among those subjects.  The smaller sample 
used for the information-treatment group was anticipated to be large enough to 
permit detection of the hypothesized biased-assimilation/polarization effects 
across subjects of diverse cultural orientations and other characteristics. 
4. Results 
4.1. No-Information Treatment: An Analysis of Nanotechnology Risk 
Perceptions 
4.1.1. What Americans Know About Nanotechnology, and What They 
Think About It 
The size of the no-information treatment group (n = 1,500) made it possi-
ble to form an assessment of how much the general public in the United States 
knows about nanotechnology and what they think about it.  We found, consis-
tent with the Hart survey, that the American public is largely uninformed about 
this novel technology.  A full 81% of our subjects reported having heard either 
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“nothing at all” (53%) or “just a little” (28%) about nanotechnology prior to be-
ing surveyed.  Only 5% reported having heard “a lot.” 
 
Nothing at all
53%
Just a little
28%
Some
14%
A lot
5%
 
Figure 1. Prior Knowledge of Nanotechnology 
Nevertheless, we also found that after being supplied with a minimal and 
nonjudgmental description of what nanotechnology is, the vast majority of 
Americans are willing to offer an opinion about its relative risks and benefits.  
Eighty-nine percent had a position one way or the other.35  Interestingly, al-
though divided, Americans, on the whole, seem relatively pro-nanotechnology.  
A majority, 53%, indicated that they believed nanotechnology’s benefits would 
either “slightly” or “strongly” outweigh its risks.  Thirty-six percent indicated 
that they believed that nanotechnology’s risks would either “slightly” or 
“strongly” outweigh its benefits.  Treating these four responses to the Nanorisk 
                                       
35 This general finding—that the proportion of persons holding an opinion on nanotechnology 
risks substantially exceeds the proportion who report having heard more than “a little” about it 
—is also consistent with the Hart survey.  In the Hart survey, however, some 47% of the re-
spondents were “unsure” whether risks outweigh benefits. Only 11% of our respondents re-
fused to take a position one way or the other.  We attribute the difference primarily to our deci-
sion to use a brief introductory statement describing what nanotechnology is before soliciting 
opinions.  
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item as a four-point scale, with “1” being “risks strongly outweigh benefits” and 
“4” being “benefits strongly outweigh risks,” the mean score for the sample was 
2.66. 
Margin of Error ± 2.5%
Risks > Benefits
36%
Not Sure
11%
Benefits > Risks
53%
 
Figure 2. Risks vs. Benefits, No-Information Condition 
An examination of opinions among subgroups of the population (Table 1), 
however, revealed somewhat more ambivalence and division.  The “white male 
effect” in risk perception refers to the tendency of white men to be less con-
cerned with all manner of risk than women and minorities.36 There is clearly a 
white male effect in assessment of nanotechnology risks.  Men (mean = 2.81) 
and whites (mean = 2.67) were significantly more disposed to see benefits as 
outweighing risks than were women (mean = 2.50) and African-Americans 
(mean = 2.32), respectively.  White males (mean = 2.85) were the most disposed 
to see benefits as outweighing risks. 
Differences among political groups appeared minimal.  There was no sig-
nificant difference in the evaluations of Republicans (mean = 2.66) and Democ-
rats (mean = 2.66), for example.  Surprisingly, liberals (mean = 2.78) held a 
slightly more positive view about the benefits and risks of nanotechnology than 
                                       
36 See Melissa Finucane, Paul Slovic, C.K. Mertz, James Flynn & Theresa A. Satterfield, Gen-
der, Race, and Perceived Risk: The "White Male" Effect, 3 Health, Risk, & Soc’y 159 (2000); Ka-
han et al., supra note 21. 
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conservatives (mean = 2.66), although the difference was borderline significant 
(p = .10).  Both conservatives and liberals had more positive views than moder-
ates (mean = 2.57), a result that also seemed a bit surprising but not particu-
larly meaningful. 
 
 Benefit > Risk Risk > Benefit mean significance    
Overall 53% 36% 2.66  –  
Men 59% 31% 2.81 a*** 
Women 47% 40% 2.50 a*** 
Whites 54% 34% 2.67 b*** 
Blacks 36% 49% 2.32 b*** 
White Males 61% 30% 2.85 c*** 
White Females 46% 39% 2.46 c*** 
Republicans 55% 35% 2.66  
Democrats 54% 37% 2.66  
Liberals 58% 33% 2.78 d*, e*** 
Conservatives 55% 35% 2.66 d*, f*** 
Moderates 48% 39% 2.57 e***, f** 
Hierarchs 53% 36% 2.64  
Egalitarians 52% 35% 2.67  
Individualists 51% 36% 2.62  
Communitarians 54% 35% 2.70  
Hierarch Individualists 54% 34% 2.65  
Hierarch Communitarians 53% 39% 2.63  
Egalitarian Individualists 47% 38% 2.56 g** 
Egalitarian Communitarians 54% 33% 2.73 g** 
Low Knowledge 47% 40% 2.51 h***, i*** 
Moderate Knowledge 80% 19% 3.18 h*** 
High Knowledge 83% 14% 3.33 i*** 
n ≈ 1,500. Shared alphabetic notation denotes significant differences in group means: 
* p ≤ .10, ** p ≤ .05, ***p ≤ .001, 2-tail. 
Table 1. Risk/Benefit Perceptions by Group, No-Information Condition 
Differences among culturally defined groups was also insubstantial.  
There were no statistically significant differences among Hierarchs (mean = 
2.64) and Egalitarians (mean = 2.67) or among Individualists (mean = 2.62) 
and Communitarians (mean = 2.70).  There was a statistically significant differ-
ence among Egalitarian Individualists (mean = 2.56) and Egalitarian Communi-
tarians (mean = 2.73), suggesting a weak disposition on the part of individual-
ists to perceive nanotechnology positively, but the difference again seemed 
largely to defy meaningful interpretation. 
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The most striking differences were based on subjects’ levels of (reported) 
knowledge.  “Low knowledge” subjects—those who indicated they had heard ei-
ther “nothing at all” or “just a little”—were considerably more disposed to see 
risks as outweighing benefits (mean = 2.51) than were either “moderate knowl-
edge” (mean = 3.18) or “high knowledge” (mean = 3.33) subjects, whose respec-
tive positive views of nanotechnology benefits did not differ significantly. 
This particular finding is ambiguous.  It could be interpreted to mean 
that exposure to information about nanotechnology tends to make persons 
more disposed to see its benefits as outweighing its risks. But another possibil-
ity is that some other influence that disposes individuals to see nanotechnology 
as beneficial also disposes them to learn more about it.  As we will discuss 
presently, results from the information-condition permit additional assessment 
of this issue. 
4.1.2. Why Americans Think What They Do About Nanotechnol-
ogy: The Role of Affect 
To attempt to explain variation in perceptions of the risks and benefits of 
nanotechnology, we conducted a multivariate regression analysis (Table 2).37  
The dependent variable was Nanorisk, reverse coded so that it measured the 
degree to which subjects perceived risks as outweighing benefits.  The inde-
pendent variables included a range of individual characteristics that we be-
lieved might likely explain differences in nanotechnology risk perceptions, in-
cluding affective responses to nanotechnology (Nanoaffc). 
We entered the variables in steps to make more transparent the relative 
impact of affect and other influences.  In step 1, we assessed the impact of all 
the independent variables other than affect.  Consistent with the simple mean 
scores by group, this analysis revealed that by far the biggest impact on 
nanotechnology risk perceptions is how much subjects know (or report know-
ing) about it (Nanoknow): the more they know, the less risky they perceive 
nanotechnology to be relative to its benefits.  The subjects’ perceptions of other 
                                       
37 Subjects who did not take a position on whether nanotechnology risks outweigh nanotech-
nology benefits or vice versa are of course omitted from the regression. Missing data, in this 
and other regression analyses, are handled generally through pairwise deletion. 
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environmental risks (Envrisk) had the next largest effect: the more concerned 
subjects were with nuclear power and global warming, the more concerned 
they were with the risks of nanotechnology.  Not surprisingly,38 the more sub-
jects trusted government to regulate risks effectively (Govtrust), the less con-
cerned they were about nanotechnology risks. 
The regression analysis slightly complicated the finding of a “white male 
effect” for nanotechnology risks.  It confirmed that being female and being 
black rather than white disposed subjects to see nanotechnology as risky, even 
controlling for other influences.  However, relative to whites, being a minority 
other than an African-American actually predicted less concern for nanotech-
nology risks. 
 
Semi-Partial Coefficients 
  Step 1  Step 2 
female  .062 **  .036 * 
other_minority  -.063 ***  -.047 ** 
black  .058 **  .040 * 
age  .021   .012  
hh_income  -.044 *  -.035 * 
education  -.046 *  -.047 ** 
parent  .013   -.01  
republican  .023   .020  
third_party  .016   .020  
conservative  .038 *  .015  
govtrust  -.086 ***  -.061 *** 
individ  -.005   .015  
hierarch  .038 *  .019  
envrisk  .115 ***  .084 *** 
nanoknow  -.276 ***  -.164 *** 
nanoaffc    -.334 *** 
R2    .18 .29  
n ≈ 1,240. DV=Nano risk > benefit. * p ≤ .10, ** p ≤ .05, ***p ≤ .01, 2-tail. 
Table 2. Regression Analysis of Nanotechnology Risk Perceptions 
Both a hierarchal cultural orientation and a conservative political ideol-
ogy had small and borderline-significant effects.  However, the direction of the 
effects—toward more concern with nanotechnology risks—was unanticipated. 
                                       
38 See Slovic, supra note 4, at 316. 
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In step 2, we added the affect variable (coded toward positive feelings) to 
the model.  It was significant and had the predicted effect on nanotechnology 
risk perceptions: the more positive subjects’ affect toward nanotechnology was, 
the less risky they perceived it to be relative to its benefits.  Indeed, affect 
proved to be the largest predictor, with an effect size double that of prior 
knowledge.  Adding affect to the model increased the model’s explanatory 
power by approximately 60%, and subsumed the (odd) effects of both cultural 
orientation and political ideology. Overall, then, the results strongly confirm the 
first main hypothesis, namely, that perceptions toward nanotechnology risks 
would be affect driven.   
Race and gender effects persisted, as did the effect of government trust, 
after the inclusion of affect. So did the effect of education: the more educated 
the subjects were, the less concerned they were about nanotechnology risks 
holding all other influences constant. 
4.1.3. Explaining Affect 
We performed additional regression analyses to attempt to determine the 
source of the variation in our subjects’ affective appraisals of nanotechnology 
(Table 3).39  Environmental risk perception had the predicted effect on affect: 
holding all other influences constant, the more concern our subjects had about 
global warming and nuclear power, the more negative their affect was toward 
nanotechnology.  The first subhypothesis was thus confirmed. 
 
                                       
39 Subjects who did not take a position on whether nanotechnology risks outweigh nanotech-
nology benefits or vice versa are omitted from the regression. Some of these subjects, however, 
did respond to the nanotechnology affect item. Including them in the regression does not pro-
duce any materially different results, with the exception that the coefficient for parent becomes 
borderline significant. 
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Semi-Partial Coefficients 
female   -.083*** 
other_minority  .040* 
black   -.062** 
age   -.018 
hh_income  .036 
education   -.005 
parent   -.030 
republican   -.005 
third_party  .011 
conservative  -.061** 
govtrust   .063** 
individ   .056** 
hierarch   -.059** 
envrisk   -.082*** 
nanoknow   .288*** 
R2   .17
n ≈ 1,240. DV=Nano risk > benefit. * p ≤ .10, ** p ≤ 
.05, ***p ≤ .01, 2-tail. 
Table 3. Regression Analysis of Nanotechnology Affect 
The second subhypothesis was that cultural worldviews would influence 
affect toward nanotechnology. Both Hierarchy and Individualism did have a 
significant effect.  However, the sign of Hierarchy was negative, indicating that 
the more hierarchical our subjects were the more negative their affect and the 
more egalitarian the more positive.  This particular result was contrary to our 
hypothesis. 
Certain other demographic characteristics also had an effect.  Thus being 
female and black both predicted negative affect. So (unexpectedly) did conser-
vative political ideology. 
By far the largest influence on affect was prior knowledge. The more sub-
jects reported having heard about nanotechnology before being surveyed, the 
more positive their affective appraisal of it. 
4.2. Information Treatment: The Impact of Information 
By comparing nanotechnology risk assessments across the information-
treatment and no-information treatment groups, we were able to assess the 
impact of information exposure on attitudes toward nanotechnology risk per-
ceptions.  The results showed that information has a profoundly ambiguous ef-
fect. 
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4.2.1. Main Effects: Information Doesn’t Matter 
The main effect of information exposure—that is, the overall effect of in-
formation exposure across the treatment groups—is essentially nil.  The re-
spective mean evaluations of nanotechnology risks of the information-
treatment group (2.65) and the no-information group (2.66) are statistically in-
significant.  Because the sample sizes of the two groups generated a likelihood 
of over 90% for detecting even a small effect size at an alpha of .10,40 it can be 
fairly concluded that balanced information of the sort reflected in our experi-
mental manipulation does not affect opinions toward nanotechnology in the 
general population. 
Benefits > 
Risks
53%
Risks > 
Benefts
36%
Not Sure
11%
Benefits > 
Risks
57%
Risks > 
Benefts
38%
Not Sure
5%
No Information Information  
Figure 3.  Views of Subjects Across Conditions 
Consistent with this finding, the overall percentages of subjects in the in-
formation group who took the position either that benefits would outweigh 
risks (57%) or that risks would outweigh benefits (38%) were quite comparable 
to those in the no-information condition (53% and 36%, respectively).  Not sur-
prisingly, the percentage of subjects in the information condition who did not 
have a view on the relative preponderance of risks and benefits (5%) was less 
than half that in the no-information (11%), a difference that was significant at 
p ≤ .01. 
                                       
40 See Jacob Cohen, Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences 33, tbl 2.3.3 (1988). 
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The absence of a main effect casts at least modest doubt on the proposi-
tion—suggested by the high correlation between prior knowledge and the view 
that benefits predominate over risks in the no-information condition—that ex-
posure to information makes individuals less concerned about nanotechnology 
risks.  As in the no-information condition, the vast majority of subjects in the 
information condition, 78%, reported having heard either “nothing at all” (52%) 
or “just a little” (26%) before the study.  Accordingly, if learning about 
nanotechnology does dispose persons to a more positive view, one might well 
have expected a sample so dominated by persons without substantial prior 
knowledge to shift toward a more positive view upon exposure to information. 
4.2.2. Individual Differences: Biased Assimilation and Polarization 
When one examines the impact of information on subgroups, however, a 
very different story emerges.  Examining differences between relevant groups of 
interest (Table 4),41 it is clear that exposure to balanced information did have a 
very profound impact on attitudes toward nanotechnology.  However, what that 
impact is—whether information inclined subjects to see risks predominating 
over benefits or vice versa—depended on the group to which they belonged. 
                                       
41 For comparing groups, we evaluated the relative differences in the means of groups of inter-
est across conditions.  For example, whereas the difference between Hierarchs and Egalitarians 
was -.03 in the no-information condition, it was .14 in the information condition, generating a 
.17 change in the difference of the two groups’ scores.  The differences between the two means 
in the two conditions were converted into z scores, the differences between which were tested 
for statistical significance.  See generally Cohen, supra note 40, at 110-11, 139-40.  Because 
the sign of the differences in means were hypothesized in advance for the groups of interest, we 
used one-tailed p value to measure significance. 
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 Mean Benefit/Risk Perception 
 No Info Group  With Info Group  Significance 
Overall 2.66  2.65  – 
Men 2.81  2.91   
Women 2.50  2.45   
Whites 2.67  2.76  a** 
Blacks 2.32  2.02  a**, b**, c** 
White Males 2.85  2.93  b** 
White Females 2.46  2.60  c** 
Republicans 2.66  2.74   
Democrats 2.66  2.62   
Liberals 2.78  2.62  d** 
Conservatives 2.66  2.71  d** 
Moderates 2.57  2.55   
Hierarchs 2.64  2.72  e* 
Egalitarians 2.67  2.58  e* 
Individualists 2.62  2.73  f** 
Communitarians 2.70  2.54  f** 
Hierarchal Individualists 2.65  2.81  g**, h** 
Hierarchical Communitarians 2.63  2.47  g** 
Egalitarian Individualists 2.56  2.60   
Egalitarian Communitarians 2.73  2.57  h** 
Low Knowledge 2.51  2.50   
Moderate Knowledge 3.18  3.10   
High Knowledge 3.33  3.14   
Shared alphabetic notation indicates significant difference in differences between mean scores of 
groups across conditions: * p ≤ .10, ** p ≤ .05, ***p ≤ .01, 1-tail. 
Table 4.  Differences in Benefit/Risk Perceptions Across Treatment Groups 
4.2.2.1. Impact on Culturally Defined Groups 
We hypothesized that information exposure would generate a “biased as-
similation and polarization effect” along cultural lines.  That is, we predicted 
that individuals would assimilate balanced information in a way biased by their 
cultural predispositions toward environmental risks generally.  This hypothesis 
was strongly confirmed by the data.  Thus, whereas hierarchs (2.64), egalitari-
ans (2.67), individualists (2.62) and communitarians (2.70) all had comparable 
mean evaluations in the no-information condition, these types diverged relative 
to one another in expected directions—Hierarchs (2.72) and individualists 
(2.73) toward benefit, and egalitarians (2.58) and communitarians (2.54) to-
ward risk—in the information condition (Figure 4).   
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Figure 4. Impact of Information Across Condition by Dimension of Cultural Worldview 
We saw a similar effect across subjects divided into the four cultural 
types formed by the overlap of the Hierarchy-Egalitarian and Individualism-
Communitarian worldview dimensions.  Although not significantly different 
from each other in the no-information condition (Table 1), Egalitarian Commu-
nitarians and Hierarchical Individualists assumed their characteristically risk-
sensitive and risk-skeptical positions, respectively, in the information condition 
(Table 4, Figure 5).  Hierarchical Communitarians and Hierarchical Individual-
ists also displayed a biased-assimilation/polarization effect, suggesting that a 
combination of hierarchical and individualistic views most powerfully disposed 
subjects to be receptive to the benefits of nanotechnology. 
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Figure 5. Impact of Information Across Condition by Culture Type 
4.2.2.2. Impact on Politically Defined Groups 
We observed a similar biased-assimilation/polarization effect among sub-
jects divided into ideological subgroups.  Whereas liberals had proven (some-
what surprisingly) more disposed to see benefits than risks relative to conser-
vatives in the no-information condition (Table 1)—an effect that weakly per-
sisted in a multivariate regression analysis before the addition of affect as an 
independent variable (Table 2)—the two groups traded places in the informa-
tion condition (Table 4, Figure 6).  This result confirmed our subhypothesis 
that biased assimilation and polarization would be observed along other rele-
vant lines in addition to cultural ones.  
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Figure 6. Impact of Information Across Condition by Ideology 
Individuals who identified as Democrats and Republicans in the informa-
tion condition also polarized relative to their counterparts in the no-information 
condition (Table 4), but the difference was not statistically significant (p = .11).  
This finding, of course, is not tantamount to saying that our experiment found 
that information does not generate divisions among individuals based on party 
affiliation.  On the contrary, there is an 89% likelihood that the effect observed 
in the data is a real one.  Moreover, although the power of our sample makes it 
very unlikely that we would have failed to observe a statistically significant ef-
fect in our experiment were cable of producing one, we would by no means be 
surprised if a stronger manipulation—e.g., information framed in a more opin-
ionated and argumentative form—generated a statistically significant finding of 
polarization among Democrats and Republicans. 
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4.2.2.3. Impact on Race and Gender Groups 
We also found biased assimilation and polarization along race and gen-
der lines.  Whites and African-Americans in the no-information condition held 
significantly different perceptions of the relative predominance of nanotechnol-
ogy risks and benefits (Table 1).  That division grew in intensity (Table 4, Figure 
7) in the information condition.  This result also confirmed our subhypothesis 
that there would be a biased-assimilation/polarization effect along lines in ad-
dition to culture. 
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Figure 7. Impact of Information Across Condition by Race 
Men and women also displayed a biased-assimilation/polarization effect 
(Table 4), but as in the case of Democrats and Republicans, the difference was 
significant at only p = .11.  We again note that this finding should not be inter-
preted to mean that we found that men and women do not polarize, much less 
that they reacted similarly, to information about nanotechnology’s risks and 
benefits. 
Among whites, however, it seems fair to conclude that there is not a bi-
ased-assimilation/polarization effect across genders.  As in the information-
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condition, white males (mean = 2.93) and white females (mean = 2.60) held 
significantly different views (p  = .01) of the risks and benefits of nanotechnol-
ogy in the information condition (Table 4).  However, the difference between the 
two, rather than increasing across the conditions, actually grew smaller (Table 
4), although by an amount that itself did not even approach statistical signifi-
cance (p = .34).  We were surprised by this result, which defied one of our sub-
hypotheses about the effect of information. 
4.2.2.4. Impact on Groups Defined by Prior Knowledge of Nanotech-
nology 
It is also fair to say that information exposure does not close the gap be-
tween persons with little prior knowledge and those with more.  Differences 
among persons with low knowledge, on the one hand, and those with moderate 
and high knowledge, on the other, remained significant in the information con-
dition (Table 4, Figure 8).  More interestingly, the difference in the mean 
evaluations of low-knowledge and moderate- and high-knowledge groups also 
did not even approach statistical significance.42  The only reason the difference 
between these groups narrowed, moreover, was that subjects with moderate or 
high knowledge in the information condition were more concerned about risks 
than were their counterparts in the no-information condition, although the dif-
ference was not significant.  
As noted, the strong correlation in the no-information condition between 
prior knowledge and a positive attitude toward nanotechnology risks and bene-
fits was subject to two interpretations: that knowledge disposes persons to a 
favorable view; or that persons disposed to a favorable view by some other in-
fluence are disposed to learn more (or at least report knowing more) about 
nanotechnology.  The observed failure of information exposure to narrow the 
gap between low-knowledge subjects, on the one hand, and moderate- and 
high-knowledge subjects, on the other, in the information condition strongly 
supports the latter view. 
                                       
42 Comparing those who reported knowing “just a little” or “nothing” with those who reported 
knowing “a little” or “nothing,” on the one hand, with those who knew “some” or “a lot,” on the 
other, the value of p, 1-tailed, was .32. 
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Figure 8. Impact of Information Across Condition by Prior Knowledge Level 
5. What We Now Know, What We Still Don’t, Plus Some More Conjec-
tures About Nanotechnology Risk Perceptions 
We began with some questions about the formation and evolution of 
nanotechnology risk perceptions.  Based on our study results, we now venture 
some answers. 
5.1. What Explains Existing Public Reactions to Nanotechnology 
Risks? 
Individuals, even ones who admittedly know little about nanotechnology, 
have views about the risks and benefits of this emerging science. How do they 
form them? 
The answer, our study demonstrates, is affectively.  As they do for myr-
iad other putatively dangerous activities, individuals form an instantaneous re-
action to nanotechnology that then guides their appraisal of its risks and bene-
fits.  Indeed, we found that this emotional response to nanotechnology better 
explains differences in individuals’ opinions than does any other factor, includ-
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ing their race or gender, their level of education, their income, their political 
and cultural commitments, their trust in government, and their level of knowl-
edge about nanotechnology. 
This finding, of course, raises the question, what accounts for individuals 
affective reactions to nanotechnology? Why are some people positively dis-
posed, and others negatively disposed, toward it? 
Our study suggests supplies at least some partial answers.  One impor-
tant influence, we found, was how individuals perceive other types of environ-
mental risks, including nuclear power and global warming.  It seems quite 
plausible, in particular, that most people, lacking much information about this 
novel form of technology, form an instantaneous reaction to it based on their 
views about technology and environmental risk more generally.  It’s only a 
guess, but we suspect individuals’ reactions to the word technology itself might 
well determine their affective response toward nanotechnology, at least before 
they have had a chance to learn much about it. 
5.2. How Is the Public Likely to React to Additional Information 
About Nanotechnology Risks? 
One might suppose that as members of the public learn more about 
nanotechnology their assessments of its risk and benefits should converge.  
Our results suggest that exactly the opposite is likely to happen. 
Specifically, we found that how people react to information depends 
largely on their values.  Individuals who hold values that predispose them to 
credit claims of environmental risk generally tend to become alarmed, whereas 
those who hold values that predispose them to dismiss claims of environmental 
risk generally tend to be become reassured, as they are exposed to balanced 
information about nanotechnology’s risks and benefits.  Thus, individuals who 
are relatively hierarchical and individualistic, on the one hand, and those who 
are relatively egalitarian and communitarian, on the other, are likely to process 
information in a biased way that polarizes them.  By the same token, people 
who describe themselves as liberals are likely to diverge from people who de-
scribe themselves as conservatives. 
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This finding is of general importance, we believe, in the study of public 
risk perceptions.  Scholarship in this field is dominated by two competing theo-
ries.43  The “rational weigher” theory holds that people, in aggregate and over 
time, generally process information about risk in a manner that promotes their 
expected utility.44  The “irrational weigher” theory, in contrast, holds that indi-
viduals lack the capacity to process information about risk in this way because 
of cognitive biases and other forms of bounded rationality.45 
Neither of these theories can explain our findings.  The rational-weigher 
theory assumes that people value protection from risk at different levels, but 
nothing in it suggests that people with different cultural values will draw differ-
ent inferences from information about whether a technology is risky.  And 
unless we make the implausible assumption that persons of different cultural 
outlooks differ in the extent of their ability to surmount limits on human cogni-
tion, there is likewise nothing in the irrational-weigher theory that would pre-
dict that persons of differing cultural outlooks will construe information about 
risks and benefits differently. 
This phenomenon is more readily explained by a third model, which we 
have called the “cultural evaluator” theory of risk perception.46  This theory 
says that individuals don’t simply weigh risks, whether rationally or irration-
ally, but rather evaluate what one position or another on those risks will signify 
about how society should be organized. What individuals learn, then, when 
they are exposed to information is not so much how a putatively dangerous ac-
tivity will advance their utility understood in narrow instrumental terms, but 
rather what position with respect to that activity will best express their cultural 
identities.47  In connection with nanotechnology, our findings suggest that even 
minimal exposure to information (information that on its face has nothing to do 
                                       
43 See Kahan et al., supra note 5, at 1074-76. 
44 See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Risk by Choice: Regulating Health and Safety in the Workplace 
(1983). 
45 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 8. 
46 See Kahan et al., supra note 5, at 1087-88. 
47 Cf. Cohen, supra note 17 (developing this point in connection with political opinions gener-
ally). 
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with culture!) is sufficient to enable people of shared cultural orientations to 
figure out what that position is. 
Nevertheless, our findings do reveal at least one interesting puzzle.  
There is clearly a positive correlation in general between how much people 
know—or at least report knowing—and the view that nanotechnology’s benefits 
outweigh its risks.  At first glance, this appears to imply that people become 
more favorably disposed to nanotechnology the more they know about it.  But 
this interpretation is almost certainly incorrect, or at least unduly simplistic.  
As our own results demonstrate, people with different values react in divergent 
ways—some negatively, some positively—to the same information.  In addition, 
considering only how much people knew prior to the study, exposing ill-
informed people to information did nothing to narrow the gap between their 
relatively negative view of nanotechnology and the relatively positive view of 
persons who describe themselves as well-informed. 
Under these circumstances, the most convincing conclusion is that the 
relationship between prior knowledge and a positive view of nanotechnology is 
spurious.  Some other influence is moving individuals who are otherwise posi-
tively disposed to nanotechnology to learn more about it. The mystery, of 
course, is what that influence is. 
Discovering how predispositions toward putatively dangerous activities 
motivate people’s own efforts to learn about that activity would be a major ad-
vance in the science of public risk perception.  Precisely because it is novel, 
nanotechnology furnishes an excellent focus for research on this question. 
6. As Goes Berkeley, So Goes the Nation? Not Necessarily 
Reacting quickly and on the basis of very little information, government 
officials in Berkeley decided that regulation of nanotechnology was appropriate 
to safeguard the public.  Should we expect democratically accountable officials 
elsewhere to follow suit?  The answer is, it depends. 
It depends, for one thing, on the cultural and political makeup of those 
communities.  We suspect that Berkeley reacted the way it did because a dis-
proportionately large portion of its population subscribes to egalitarian and 
communitarian worldviews.  Indeed, it was probably his experience at the Uni-
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versity of California, Berkeley, that moved political scientist Aaron Wildavsky, 
one of the founders of the cultural theory of risk, to draw a connection between 
an egalitarian, collectivist orientation and sensitivity to environmental risk.48  
The American population as a whole, however, is culturally diverse. In other 
localities, ones that are more inclined toward hierarchy and individualism, the 
impulse to regulate nanotechnology will surely be much less intense. 
What does this mean, though, about regulation of nanotechnology at the 
national level, where most significant environmental law is formed?  A distinct 
possibility is that nanotechnology, as it assumes a bigger profile (!) in the pub-
lic imagination, will become a subject of increasing division.  After all, we were 
able to generate cultural and ideological polarization among our subjects using 
balanced information.  Because individuals in the real world are much more 
likely to select information in a biased fashion that matches their cultural and 
political dispositions,49 one might anticipate even more extreme polarization 
outside the lab.  Nanotechnology, on this view, could go the route of nuclear 
power and other controversial technologies, becoming a focal point of culturally 
infused political conflict. 
But that admittedly bleak outcome isn’t a certainty, either, in our view.  
The cultural cognition of risk suggests that individuals are likely to respond to 
risks in a way that expresses their values. But nothing in the theory implies 
that those responses are somehow fixed in some way that defies the power of 
society itself to manage.  
Indeed, there have been instances in which democratically accountable 
officials have forged conditions enabling citizens of opposing cultural views to 
converge on appropriate risk-abatement policies.50  These success stories, 
                                       
 
48 See Douglas & Wildavsky, supra note 22. 
49 See Braman et al., supra note 18. 
50 See Kahan et al., supra note 5, at 1097-98; see also Donald Braman & Dan M. Kahan, Over-
coming the Fear of Guns, the Fear of Gun Control, and the Fear of Cultural Politics: Constructing a 
Better Gun Debate, 55 Emory L.J. 569, 588-98 (2006); cf. Geoffrey Cohen, David Sherman, An-
thony Bastardi, Michelle McGoey, Lillian Hsu, & Lee Ross, Bridging the Partisan Divide: Self-
Affirmation Reduces Ideological Closed-Mindedness and Inflexibility, J. Personality & Social 
Psych. (forthcoming 2007); Geoffrey L. Cohen, J. Aronson & C. M. Steele, When Beliefs Yield to 
Evidence: Reducing Biased Evaluation by Affirming the Self, 26 Personality and Social Psych. 
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however, reinforce the major conclusion of our study: that mere dissemination 
of scientifically sound information is not by itself sufficient to overcome the di-
visive tendencies of cultural cognition.  Those in a position to educate the pub-
lic—from government officials to scientists to members of industry—must also 
intelligently frame that information in ways that make it possible for persons of 
diverse cultural orientations to reconcile it with their values. 
It’s not clear whether the nation will go the way of Berkeley—or for that 
matter, even where Berkeley itself will go—on nanotechnology. What is clear, 
however, is society’s desperate need for a new science of “democratic risk delib-
eration” that makes it possible to identify regulatory policies that simultane-
ously promote the welfare and affirm the values of a culturally diverse citizenry. 
                                                                                                                           
Bull. 1151 (2000) (finding that self-affirmation promotes willingness to consider information 
that challenges beliefs held by one’s ideological reference group). 
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Appendix A 
Knowledge Networks Panels and Sample for this Study 
1. Knowledge Networks 
Knowledge Networks (http://www.knowledgenetworks.com/) is a public 
opinion research firm with offices located throughout the United States.  It 
maintains an active respondent pool of some 40,000 persons who are recruited 
to participate in on-line surveys and experiments administered on behalf of 
academic and governmental researchers and private businesses.  Knowledge 
Network respondents agree to participate in three to four surveys per month in 
exchange for Internet access and other forms of compensation.  It uses re-
cruitment and sampling methods that assure a diverse sample that is demog-
raphically representative of the U.S. population.  Numerous studies have con-
cluded that on-line testing of Knowledge Network samples generates results 
equivalent in their reliability to conventional random-digit-dial surveys 
(http://www.knowledgenetworks.com/ganp/2005aapor.html, and studies us-
ing Knowledge Networks facilities are routinely published in peer-reviewed aca-
demic journals 
(http://www.knowledgenetworks.com/ganp/docs/List%20of%20Journals%208
-28-2006.pdf).  
2. Demographic composition of sample for this study 
a. Total number of subjects: 1,862. 
b. Gender: 51% female, 49% male. 
c. Race: 72% white, 10.1% African-American. 
d. Average age: 46.4 years. 
e. Median household income: $35,000 to $40,000. 
f. Median education level: Some college. 
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Appendix B 
Select Experiment Survey Instrument Items 
1.  Cultural Orientation Scales 
Four-point response scale for all items: Strongly Disagree, Disagree, 
Agree and Strongly Agree. 
Individualism-Solidarism Scale 
1. IINTRSTS.  The government interferes far too much in our everyday 
lives. 
2. SHARM. Sometimes government needs to make laws that keep peo-
ple from hurting themselves.  
3. IPROTECT.  It's not the government's business to try to protect peo-
ple from themselves.  
4. IPRIVACY.  The government should stop telling people how to live 
their lives.  
5. SPROTECT.  The government should do more to advance society's 
goals, even if that means limiting the freedom and choices of individuals.   
6. SLIMCHOI.  Government should put limits on the choices individu-
als can make so they don't get in the way of what's good for society.   
7. SNEEDS.  It's society's responsibility to make sure everyone's basic 
needs are met. 
8. INEEDY.  It's a mistake to ask society to help every person in need.  
9. SRELY.  People should be able to rely on the government for help 
when they need it.  
10. IRESPON.  Society works best when it lets individuals take responsi-
bility for their own lives without telling them what to do.   
11. ITRIES.  Our government tries to do too many things for too many 
people. We should just let people take care of themselves.  
12. IFIX.  If the government spent less time trying to fix everyone's prob-
lems, we'd all be a lot better off.  
13. IENJOY.  People who are successful in business have a right to enjoy 
their wealth as they see fit. 
14. IMKT.  Free markets—not government programs—are the best way to 
supply people with the things they need.  
15. IPROFIT.  Private profit is the main motive for hard work.  
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16. IGOVWAST.  Government regulations are almost always a waste of 
everyone's time and money.  
Hierarchy-Egalitarianism Scale 
1. HEQUAL.  We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this 
country.  
2. HREVDIS1.  Nowadays it seems like there is just as much dis-
crimination against whites as there is against blacks.  
3. EWEALTH.  Our society would be better off if the distribution of 
wealth was more equal.  
4. ERADEQ.  We need to dramatically reduce inequalities between 
the rich and the poor, whites and people of color, and men and women.  
5. EDISCRIM.  Discrimination against minorities is still a very seri-
ous problem in our society.  
6. HREVDIS2.  It seems like blacks, women, homosexuals and other 
groups don't want equal rights, they want special rights just for them.  
7. HCHEATS.  It seems like the criminals and welfare cheats get all 
the breaks, while the average citizen picks up the tab.  
8. EDIVERS.  It's old-fashioned and wrong to think that one cul-
ture's set of values is better than any other culture's way of seeing the 
world.  
9. HWMNRTS.  The women's rights movement has gone too far.  
10. ESEXIST.  We live in a sexist society that that is fundamentally 
set up to discriminate against women.  
11. HTRADFAM.  A lot of problems in our society today come from 
the decline in the traditional family, where the man works and the woman 
stays home.  
12. HFEMININ.  Society as a whole has become too soft and feminine.  
13. EROUGH.  Parents should encourage young boys to be more sen-
sitive and less rough and tough. 
2.  Government Trust Item 
GOVTRUST.  The federal government can be trusted to protect the public 
from environmental and technological risks. [Strongly Disagree, Disagree, 
Agree, Strongly Agree] 
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3.  Environmental Risk Perception Items 
How much risk do you believe each of the following poses to the safety or 
health of people in our society? [Almost No Risk, Slight Risk, Moderate Risk, 
High Risk] 
 
GLOBWARM. Global Warming 
. . . 
NUKEPOW. Nuclear Power 
4.  Nanotechnology Items 
General Introduction and knowledge item 
INTRO9. Now we would like to know what you think about nanotechnol-
ogy. Nanotechnology is the ability to measure, see, predict and make things on 
the extremely small scale of atoms and molecules.  Materials created with 
nanotechnology can often be made to exhibit very different physical, chemical, 
and biological properties than their normal size counterparts. 
NANOKNOW.  How much have you heard about nanotechnology before 
today? [Nothing at All, Just a Little, Some, A Lot] 
Information Manipulation 
The potential benefits of nanotechnology include the use of nanomateri-
als in products to make them stronger, lighter and more effective.  Some 
examples are food containers that kill bacteria, stain-resistant clothing, 
high performance sporting goods, faster, smaller computers, and more 
effective skincare products and sunscreens.  Nanotechnology also has 
the potential to provide new and better ways to treat disease, clean up 
the environment, enhance national security, and provide cheaper energy.   
While there has not been conclusive research on the potential risks of 
nanotechnology, there are concerns that some of the same properties 
that make nanomaterials useful might make them harmful.  It is thought 
that some nanomaterials may be harmful to humans if they are breathed 
in and might cause harm to the environment.  There are also concerns 
that invisible, nanotechnology-based monitoring devices could pose a 
threat to national security and personal privacy. 
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Affect Item 
NANOAFFECT. How would you say nanotechnology makes you feel? [very 
bad, bad, neither good nor bad, good, very good] 
Risk/Benefit Item 
NANORISK.  Do you think  
(1) the risks of nanotechnology will greatly outweigh its benefits 
(2) the risks of nanotechnology will slightly outweigh its benefits 
(3) the benefits of nanotechnology will slightly outweigh its risks 
(4) the benefits of nanotechnology will greatly outweigh its risks 
